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ESSAY 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE UNDER ATTACK: 
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MICHAEL M. BAYLSON, ELIZABETH COYNE, MARTHA GUARNIERI  
& SAMANTHA WEISS † 
There is no virtue like necessity. 
 –WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING RICHARD II act 1, sc. 3. 
INTRODUCTION 
Did the longest government shutdown in United States history this past 
winter constitute a severe threat to a functioning and independent federal 
judiciary? In short, yes. 
From the vantage point of a district court’s chambers, we experienced 
firsthand the uncertainty that almost weakened the federal judiciary when 
Congress and the President were at odds over the budget, threatening the 
judicial branch of the government with shrinkage or closure. This Essay asserts 
a viable legal theory—we call it a “theory of necessity”1—to prevent any 
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1 A theory of necessity is recognized in several areas of the law, including bankruptcy, taxation, 
and criminal law. See, e.g., Manners v. Cannella, 891 F.3d 959, 972 (11th Cir. 2018) (explaining that a 
criminal defendant may assert the “doctrine of necessity” as an affirmative defense under Florida 
state law to challenge a charge of fleeing the police), cert. denied, No. 18-6908, 2019 WL 1590272 
(U.S. Apr. 15, 2019); In re United Am., Inc., 327 B.R. 776, 781 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2005) (explaining 
that, in bankruptcy cases, the equitable “Doctrine of Necessity” aims to balance Chapter 11’s goals 
of paying pre-petition creditors with treating all creditors equally). A previous law review note 
proposed that “state courts should invoke inherent power against a legislature only under a standard 
of absolute necessity to perform the duties required by federal and state constitutional law.” Andrew 
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constitutional crisis caused by a future government shutdown. This theory 
invokes four building blocks of well-established legal doctrines that, when 
connected, pave a path to secure the judicial branch’s autonomy. The theory of 
necessity requires the legislative and executive branches to recognize their 
constitutional obligations to fund the judicial branch, without interruption. 
These four building block doctrines are: 
 
1. The inherent power of courts to require the legislative 
and executive branches of government to provide reasonable  
and necessary funding; 
2. The Take Care Clause of the United States Constitution requiring 
the President to enforce the laws, which surely include the laws 
establishing lower federal courts and their jurisdiction; 
3. Holding the Antideficiency Act unconstitutional as applied to the 
judiciary during a government shutdown; and 
4. A legislative or mandamus remedy, to apply these principles 
effectively and appropriately against both Congress and the 
Executive, if necessary. 
 
In analyzing the constitutional issues presented by a shutdown of the 
judiciary, these well-established principles are attracted to each other, as how 
Mozart’s Papageno is attracted to Papagena. The concept of the United 
States’ judicial system terminating its operations because of a political dispute 
between the executive and legislative branches requires adoption of this 
theory of necessity—that when threatened with a cessation of funds, the 
judiciary can take action to protect its independence and its continued 
functioning as a separate branch of government. 
Of course, the word “necessary” is found in the text of the Constitution. 
Under Article I, Section 8, Congress has the power “[t]o make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing 
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government 
of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”2 In the 
constitutional law context, “necessity” is often referenced when evaluating 
 
W. Yates, Note, Using Inherent Judicial Power in a State-Level Budget Dispute, 62 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1463 
(2013) (emphasis added). What we advocate is that the concept of reasonable necessity protects the 
autonomy of federal courts in a government shutdown. 
2 Alexander Hamilton’s interpretation of this clause was the subject of Federalist Paper No. 33. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 33 (Alexander Hamilton). The concept of necessity was central to the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
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the power of the President or Congress to act in the face of a national 
emergency.3 As Thomas Jefferson explained: 
A strict observance of the written laws is doubtless one of the high duties of 
a good citizen, but it is not the highest. The laws of necessity, of self-
preservation, of saving our country when in danger, are of higher obligation. 
To lose our country by a scrupulous adherence to written law, would be to 
lose the law itself, with life, liberty, property and all those who are enjoying 
them with us; thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the means.4 
From a federal trial judge’s point of view, the concept of a shutdown 
impacting the judicial branch is utterly inconsistent with what we practice 
and preach every day in our opinions and courtrooms, whether in a simple 
personal injury case based on diversity or a complex federal question dispute. 
Therefore, we see our building block approach as providing the much-desired 
solution, and one which serves to rightfully insulate the administration of 
justice from those unnecessary failures of governance. 
I. BACKGROUND: THE 2019 SHUTDOWN 
On December 22, 2018, President Donald J. Trump announced a partial 
government shutdown in response to disagreements with Congress over the 
2019 appropriations bill. The shutdown affected over 800,000 federal 
employees and lasted for thirty-five days, making it the longest shutdown in 
United States history.5 During the funding lapse, the work of many 
government agencies came to a halt. The federal judiciary was threatened by 
the impasse but was able to use nonappropriated funds—comprised mainly of 
court fees—to continue most judicial functions from December 22, 2018 
through February 1, 2019.6 Similar shutdowns of varying lengths have occurred 
 
3 See, e.g., Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream on: The Obama Administration’s 
Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 
781-87 (2013) (describing the Obama administration’s decision not to enforce removal provisions of 
an immigration law and arguing that the “Take Care Clause imposes on the President a duty to 
enforce all constitutionally valid acts of Congress in all situations and cases”). 
4 Id. at 817 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to J.B. Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810), in 12 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 418 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907)).  
5 Lisa Rein, Tracy Jan & Kimberly Kindy, Federal Employees Return to Backlog of Work After  
35-Day Shutdown, WASH. POST (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/federal-
employees-return-to-backlog-of-work-after-35-day-shutdown/2019/01/28/10030766-231c-11e9-81fd-
b7b05d5bed90_story.html?utm_term=.abf9970eddf5 [https://perma.cc/A268-RRML]. 
6 Through a series of eleven memoranda, James Duff, Director of the Administrative Office of 
the United States Courts (AO), updated judges, court staff, and federal defender offices about the 
ability of the judiciary to function during the partial government shutdown. Duff communicated 
that funding would extend only though February 1, 2019, but that essential court operations could 
continue thereafter. See Judiciary Has Funds to Operate Through Jan. 31, UNITED STATES COURTS 
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since 1980; most notably, a 1995–96 shutdown that lasted twenty-one days 
under President Clinton and a 2013 shutdown that lasted seventeen days under 
President Obama. No shutdown in history, however, has come so close to 
threatening the continued functioning of the federal judiciary as the most 
recent shutdown. The chambers of the authors of this Essay, Judge Michael 
Baylson and his law clerks, experienced the effects of the shutdown first-hand. 
In United States v. Hoover, a complex, nine-defendant narcotics conspiracy case, 
several defense counsel insisted on a trial within the time limits of the Speedy 
Trial Act (STA).7 The Assistant United States Attorney represented on the 
record that the Government was unable to comply with the court’s discovery 
deadlines because of the shutdown.8 As a result, the court had no choice but to 
delay the deadline for production of important discovery material to all defense 
counsel. If the shutdown had continued, the consequences, like the proverbial 
tumbling domino blocks, may have required dismissal of the charges because of 
the Government’s failure to produce discovery.9 
II. TOWARD A THEORY OF NECESSITY 
The shutdown ended on January 25, 2019, just days before the judicial 
branch would have depleted the funds necessary to perform its 
constitutionally-mandated duties. That a political battle between the 
executive and legislative branches could cripple the judicial branch’s ability to 
adjudicate disputes constitutes a breach of the principle of separation of 
powers that is fundamental to the United States Constitution and echoed in 
state constitutions. This Essay argues that the executive and legislative 
branches not only have the power, but also the duty, to ensure that the judicial 
branch has reasonable and necessary funds. This theory of necessity compels 
judges to advocate for funds, through litigation if necessary, to ensure 
continued operations in the face of future threats to annual appropriations. 
A. Under Common Law Principles, Courts Have Inherent Power to  
Ensure Their Continued Operations 
The judicial branch has the inherent power to require the legislative and 
executive branches to provide reasonable and necessary funds to function as 
a separate and independent branch of government. This inherent power—the 
 
(Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2019/01/22/judiciary-has-funds-operate-through-
jan-31 [https://perma.cc/DF7A-B7MU]. 
7 No. 18-249 (E.D. Pa. filed Oct. 17, 2018 ). 
8 Transcript of Record at 18-25, United States v. West, No. 18-249-2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 17, 2019) (“Your 
Honor, the Government . . . ha[s] not been able to meet the . . . deadline . . . . [O]ur litigation support 
staff and IT people have been furloughed, and we cannot . . . process [cellphone evidence] without them.”). 
9 See infra note 22 (describing the STA and cases where it was used to vacate convictions). 
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first of our four building blocks—is a function of the separation of powers 
doctrine fundamental to our system of government and embodied in both the 
United States Constitution and state constitutions. 
The idea that the judiciary has the inherent power to maintain its 
existence is an established legal doctrine. Several state supreme courts have 
strongly endorsed this principle by requiring the legislative and executive 
bodies of state governments to provide “reasonable and necessary” funds for 
the operation of their state court systems. In the following pages, we refer to 
litigation in state supreme courts which precipitated from stubborn 
interbranch conflict and which required a judicial resolution. These state 
court decisions have clearly and consistently enforced the principles that state 
appropriating bodies have an obligation to provide the judiciary with 
“reasonable and necessary” funds as opposed to a blank check; that depriving 
courts of such funds for their proper functioning is contrary to the doctrine 
of separation of powers; and, most importantly, that courts have inherent 
power to compel governing bodies to appropriate those funds. 
Again, we draw on the personal experience of the lead author of this Essay, 
Judge Michael Baylson, who, as a young lawyer with the Philadelphia firm of 
Duane, Morris & Heckscher in 1970, drafted the complaint in a successful 
mandamus action brought by the President Judge of Philadelphia’s Common 
Pleas Court against the Mayor and City Council of Philadelphia.10 This 
action has played a key role in the development of this theory of necessity. 
In Carroll v. Tate, the City Council’s failure to appropriate necessary funds 
prompted the filing. After a non-jury trial, Judge Harry A. Montgomery, 
sitting by designation, issued a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania affirmed, and stated: 
Unless the Legislature can be compelled by the Courts to provide the money 
which is reasonably necessary for the proper functioning and administration 
of the Courts, our entire Judicial system could be extirpated, and the 
Legislature could make a mockery of our form of Government with its three 
co-equal branches—the Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial.11 
Following remand by the state supreme court, the City entered into a 
settlement agreement supplying additional funds for court operations, 
demonstrating that the judiciary’s inherent power to enforce the separation 
of powers can be an effective legal tool to secure reasonable and necessary 
funding for the federal judiciary.12 
 
10 See Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 274 A.2d 193 (Pa. 1971). 
11 Id. at 199 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 431). 
12 Pennsylvania state courts, following Carroll, have emphasized that legislative action that 
impairs the independence of the judiciary would be contrary to the doctrine of separation of powers. 
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More recently, a Michigan trial court sought to compel two county funding 
units to appropriate funds for enhanced pension and retiree health plans, as 
necessary to recruit and maintain staff to carry out the court’s essential 
functions.13 The lower court found in favor of the plaintiff Trial Court in part 
because the funds were “reasonable and necessary” to its ability to perform its 
constitutional duties; the appellate court affirmed.14 Under this “reasonable 
and necessary” doctrine, as outlined by the court, “in those rare instances in 
which the legislature’s allocation of resources impacts the ability of the judicial 
branch to carry out its constitutional responsibilities, what is otherwise 
exclusively a part of the legislative power becomes, to that extent, a part of the 
judicial power.”15 In support of this proposition, the court referenced a 
relevant observation by James Madison, connecting the state court’s power to 
compel reasonable and necessary funds to the federal government: 
 [M]embers of each department should be as little dependent as possible 
on those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their offices .	.	.	. 
As the legislat[ure] .	.	. alone has access to the pockets of the people, and 
has in some constitutions full discretion, and in all a prevailing influence over 
the pecuniary rewards of those who will fill the other departments, a 
dependence is thus created in the latter, which gives still greater facility to 
encroachments of the former.16   
Although ultimately upholding the principle in crafting its judicial test, 
the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to establish that the benefits 
requested were “reasonable and necessary” to the “serviceability” of the court.17 
New York and Ohio state courts have similarly recognized that in failing 
to allocate sufficient funds for the judiciary to carry out its functions, the 
legislature or appropriating body violates the constitutional principle of separation 
 
See, e.g., Pa. State Ass’n of Cty. Comm’rs v. Commonwealth, 681 A.2d 699, 703 (Pa. 1996)  
(per curiam) (quoting McCulloch and holding that a writ of mandamus to require the General Assembly 
to enact a funding scheme that would provide necessary financial support for state courts was 
warranted); Beckert v. Warren, 439 A.2d 638, 642 (Pa. 1982) (citing Carroll and requiring county 
commissioners to provide funding for court staff and salary increases for court-related personnel 
and noting “the judiciary’s inherent power to compel expenditures necessary to prevent the 
impairment of its exercise of the judicial power or of the proper administration of justice”). 
13 46th Cir. Trial Court v. Crawford Cty., 719 N.W.2d 553, 555-56 (Mich. 2006). 
14 Id. at 558. 
15 Id. at 560. 
16 Id. (citations omitted) (quoting THE FEDERALIST Nos. 51, 48 (James Madison)). 
17 Id. at 569. 
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of powers.18 Notably, New York’s highest court has suggested that the judiciary 
has the authority to require appropriations for court-appointed counsel.19 
These principles have not yet been applied in the context of a federal 
government shutdown, but in this increasingly divisive political climate, they 
should be. The strategies employed by litigants in state courts provide just a 
few examples of how federal courts could preserve their autonomy in the face 
of a future executive–legislative tug-of-war. The common law doctrine of 
courts’ inherent power to secure funding is fundamental to the building 
blocks for which we advocate to insulate the federal judiciary from the 
detrimental effects of a shutdown. 
Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized these same concerns during 
the 1995 shutdown, when he requested that Congress “separate the judiciary’s 
budget from the comprehensive appropriation for Commerce, Justice, State, 
and the Judiciary, of which it is traditionally a part.”20 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist recognized that 
the judiciary is not part of the law-making process, and nothing in the 
judiciary’s budget involves any dispute of principle between Congress and 
the President .	.	.	. There is simply no reason for depriving the public of any 
part of the function which the judicial branch performs because of disputes 
between the executive and legislative branches with respect to other agencies 
included in the larger appropriation bill.21 
We agree. 
The concept of separation of powers warrants application of a theory of 
necessity to protect the federal judiciary from legislative curtailment.22 The 
 
18 Ascione v. City of New York, 379 N.Y.S.2d 599, 606 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) (“Included in 
this concept [of separation of powers] is the obvious caveat that the ‘appropriating body’ must 
appropriate sufficient funds for all three branches of government to carry out its functions.”); 
State ex rel. Rudes v. Rofkar, Nos. OT-83-14, OT-83-15, OT-83-16, 1983 WL 6971, at *4 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Oct. 14, 1983) (“Because an independent court system is the mainstay of the rule of law in 
a free society, co-ordinate branches of the government may not fiscally restrain or hamper the 
courts in effectively discharging their sundry judicial responsibilities.”); see, e.g., Kelch v. Town 
Bd. of Davenport, 829 N.Y.S.2d 250, 252-53 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (holding that town’s legislative 
action in setting a justice’s salary at $500 per year violated the principles of separation of powers 
and judicial independence embodied in the New York and United States constitutions). 
19 Hurrell-Herring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 227 (N.Y. 2010) (reversing a lower court ruling that 
the state’s requirement that counties fund indigent defense with county resources was non-justiciable 
and noting that “[i]t [was], of course, possible that a remedy . . . would necessitate the appropriation 
of funds and perhaps, particularly in a time of scarcity, some reordering of legislative priorities”). 
20 See William H. Rehnquist, 1995 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, 19 AM. J. 
TRIAL ADVOC. 491, 492 (1996). 
21 Id. 
22 The STA provides one example of federal courts recognizing that the concept of separation 
of powers may act to limit legislative action. See, e.g., United States v. Howard, 440 F. Supp. 1106, 
1109-11 (D. Md. 1977)(citing Carroll and relying on the Federalist Papers and the court’s “inherent 
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judicial branch must be able to function effectively as a check on its 
counterparts while fulfilling its role as adjudicator. With this foundation, 
when courts are threatened with loss of reasonably necessary funding for their 
continued operations, they have the right—if not the obligation—to exercise 
their inherent power to require that funds be provided. These cases, and 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s petition to Congress, establish the first building 
block of our theory—that federal courts have the inherent authority to do 
what is necessary (i.e., seek mandamus, demand funds from Congress, etc.) 
to maintain their existence.23 
B. The Take Care Clause Requires the President to  
Protect Judicial Functioning 
Article II, Section 3 of the U.S. Constitution, which requires that the 
President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” creates “the 
Chief Executive’s most important constitutional duty.”24 This clause, known 
as the Take Care Clause, is the second building block in our theory of 
necessity. We argue that the Take Care Clause requires the President, in the 
event of a government shutdown, to ensure the continued functioning of the 
judicial system. Surely, the laws establishing lower federal courts are among 
the “Laws” that fall within the President’s duty if and when the Legislature 
fails to provide sufficient funds. The absence of any federal precedent in so 
holding is not, in light of the common law principles discussed in Section 
II.A, a bar to invoking the Take Care Clause in advocating for a theory of 
 
power to preserve the efficient and expeditious administration of justice and protect it from being 
impaired or destroyed” in concluding that Congress’s imposition of a time limit in the STA offended 
the doctrine of separation of powers), aff ’d, 590 F.2d 564  
(4th Cir. 1979); see also United States v. Martinez, 538 F.2d 921, 923 (2d Cir. 1976) (noting that there 
was a question under the doctrine of separation of powers of whether Congress could “exercise 
judicial authority” to the extent covered by the STA). The Fourth Circuit has since upheld the STA, 
but the doctrine of separation of powers articulated in both Howard and Martinez remains 
fundamental. See United States v. Brainer, 691 F.2d 691, 699 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding that the STA 
was constitutional because the possibility that the STA would prevent the judicial branch from 
accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions “would appear to be remote”); see also United 
States v. Williams, 917 F.3d 195, 205 (3d Cir. 2019) (applying the STA to vacate convictions); United 
States v. Reese, 917 F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir. 2019) (same). 
23 Prior scholarship has addressed the idea that courts, particularly state courts, have inherent 
powers to ensure their own funding. E.g., G. Gregg Webb & Keith E. Whittington, Judicial 
Independence, the Power of the Purse, and Inherent Judicial Powers, 88 JUDICATURE 12 (2004); William 
S. Ferguson, Note, Judicial Financial Autonomy and Inherent Power, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 975 (1972); 
Note, supra note 1. All three articles cite Carroll v. Tate. We draw from similar precedent as well as 
our own experience in a federal trial judge’s chambers to apply the doctrine of inherent power in the 
context of a federal shutdown. 
24 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992). 
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necessity to ensure the continued functioning of the judicial branch despite a 
shutdown of the legislative and executive branches.25 
The Take Care Clause is an untapped resource that can and should be 
called upon to restore the constitutional balance emphasized by the Founders 
in the event of a future shutdown. For example, Alexander Hamilton 
recognized that the judiciary 
will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution 
.	.	.	. [because it] has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no 
direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take 
no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE 
nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid 
of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.26 
Alexis de Tocqueville appropriately observed during this country’s infancy 
that the power of the President, unlike a monarch, “is also the executive of laws; 
but he does not really co-operate in making them, since the refusal of his assent 
does not prevent their passage. He is not, therefore, a part of the sovereign 
power, but only its agent.”27 De Tocqueville’s view of the President as an 
“agent” may not be his most perceptive prediction of the future given the 
President’s executive powers. However, as there are very few Supreme Court 
decisions examining how the Take Care Clause limits the President’s autonomy, 
the notion that the President is an agent whose role, at least as to the judiciary, 
is to “take Care that the [separation of powers principle] be faithfully executed” 
remains a viable path toward preserving judicial autonomy.28 
Indeed, the limits of a President’s authority to ignore the wishes of the 
Legislature to further his or her own political agenda has recently been 
challenged. President Trump’s February 2019 declaration of a national 
emergency to secure border wall funding has spurred a flurry of lawsuits 
 
25 At least one federal court has explained that a violation of the Take Care Clause may 
unconstitutionally interfere with separation of powers principles, acknowledging, to a degree, the 
interplay between the first and second building blocks. See Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 640 F. Supp. 
2d 714, 715, 724, 726 (E.D. Va. 2009) (citations omitted) (noting in a false patent marking action that if 
31 U.S.C. § 292(b), which provides qui tam relator standing, violated the Take Care Clause by failing to 
grant the executive branch sufficient control over litigation, “‘disrupt[ing] the proper balance between 
the coordinate branches,’” the Supreme Court would strike the law as unconstitutional). 
26 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
27 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 124 (P. Bradley ed., Vintage 
Books 1990) (1835). 
28 See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1952) (holding 
that President Truman had no constitutional authority to direct the Secretary of Commerce to 
take possession of and operate the nation’s steel mills to avoid a “national emergency”); Ex parte 
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139 (1866) (“The power to make the necessary laws is in Congress; 
the power to execute in the President . . . . Both are servants of the people, whose will is 
expressed in the fundamental law.”). 
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challenging the President’s designation of funds to build a wall between the 
United States and Mexico as violating the Constitution.29 The President has 
some authority to determine the use of funds in the possession of the United 
States Treasury for emergency measures, functioning of the military, law 
enforcement, and public safety purposes, etc.30 However, the Spending Power 
is exclusively vested with Congress,31 and the President may not write statutes 
or alter those written by Congress.32 
Court decisions have thus played an important role in adjudicating 
disputes over presidential power. Just as there are precedents demonstrating 
the courts’ ability to restrict unlimited presidential power, there have also 
been instances where the President has enforced the authority of the 
 
29 See, e.g., Complaint at 15-16, Sierra Club v. Trump, No. 19-0892 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2019) 
(alleging that temporary appropriations reinforce Congress’s constitutional duty to act as a check 
upon the executive branch and that the Appropriations and Presentment Clauses prohibit the 
President from modifying appropriations bills or drawing money from the Treasury in a manner 
that undermines congressional appropriations). Demonstrating the constitutional limits on the 
President’s autonomy, the Senate vetoed the President’s emergency declaration for the first time in 
history. Emily Cochrane & Glenn Thrush, Senate Rejects Trump’s Border Emergency Declaration, Setting 
Up First Veto, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/14/us/politics/ 
senate-vote-trump-national-emergency.html [https://perma.cc/AAS7-TMK7]. 
The question of whether the President’s directives to executive branch agencies to further 
his or her own policy objectives violates the Take Care Clause has recently been raised. See Ariz. 
DREAM Act Coal. v. Brewer, 855 F.3d 957, 959, 975-76, 984 (9th Cir. 2017) (affirming the 
injunction against enforcement of Arizona’s policy of denying drivers’ licenses to Deferred Action 
for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) recipients on the basis of preemption but noting that DACA did 
not amount to a suspension of the Immigration and Naturalization Act in violation of the Take 
Care Clause); Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 135, 146 & n.3 (5th Cir. 2015) (affirming 
injunction against enforcement of Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful 
Permanent Residents (DAPA) based on a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act but 
declining to address whether the Department of Homeland Security guidance implementing 
DAPA violated the Take Care Clause), aff ’d mem. by an equally divided Court sub nom. United 
States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). No court has ruled on this issue, leaving open the question 
of the scope of the President’s regulatory power. 
30 The President’s power to use emergency funds derives from several sources. See, e.g., 10 
U.S.C. § 2808 (2012) (allowing the President to redirect federal appropriations in response to 
an emergency declaration); 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1621–1622 (2012) (authorizing the President to 
declare a national emergency). 
31 Congress has very broad and exclusive powers under the Spending Clause. U.S. CONST.  
art. I, § 8, cl. 1. See generally City of Phila. v. Sessions, 309 F. Supp. 3d 289 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (citing 
City of Phila. v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 579, 639-47 (E.D. Pa. 2017)) (acknowledging that the 
Supreme Court has yet to define the outer bounds of the “relatedness” limit on Spending Clause 
legislation but issuing a preliminary injunction preventing the Attorney General from enforcing 
Byrne JAG grant conditions), aff ’d in part and vacated in part sub nom. City of Phila. v. Att’y Gen., 916 
F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2019). 
32 For instance, the Supreme Court held that the Line Item Veto Act was unconstitutional. 
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 420, 438, 447-48 (1998) (writing for a 6–3 majority, 
Justice Stevens explained that the President, unlike Congress, has no power “to enact, to amend, or 
to repeal statutes,” and so the Act was unconstitutional because it gave “the President the unilateral 
power to change the text of duly enacted statutes” in violation of Article I, § 7). 
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judiciary. For example, President Eisenhower issued an Executive Order33 
requiring troops to facilitate desegregation in the Little Rock School District 
pursuant to an order by the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Arkansas after the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education.34 
In the same vein, although litigation challenging a shutdown as a violation 
of the Take Care Clause is a new legal frontier, federal courts have invoked 
the Take Care Clause when requiring the President to comply with court 
orders, demonstrating the judiciary’s ability to protect its own authority while 
enforcing the separation of powers doctrine. In Nixon v. Sirica, the President 
argued that certain items requested in a grand jury subpoena, including 
communications between him and his closest advisors related to his duties 
under the Take Care Clause, were privileged.35 The district court ordered the 
President to produce these items for in camera inspection, and a majority of 
the D.C. Circuit affirmed.36 In a later, related case, the Supreme Court 
rejected the President’s argument that the independence of the executive 
branch insulated him from a judicial subpoena issued during an ongoing 
criminal prosecution.37 Such an absolute executive privilege, the Court held, 
“would upset the constitutional balance of ‘a workable government’ and 
gravely impair the role of the courts under Art. III.”38 
These various precedents reflect substantial authority entrusted to the 
judiciary to serve as a guiding force through uncharted terrain in the area  
of separation of powers. They also suggest significant power for self-
preservation of that authority. Vindicating such power would warrant a court 
to require the President to continue funding the federal judiciary by ruling 
that the judiciary is not to be affected by any shutdown order. 
Case law and pending litigation emphasizing the limits on the President’s 
autonomy open the door to challenges that the President’s failure to sign an 
appropriations bill would violate his or her duty to “take Care that the 
[Constitution and the separation of powers principles therein] are faithfully 
executed.” This is particularly true when the President uses that autonomy 
to encroach upon the power of the courts. This embodies our second building 
 
33 Initially, President Eisenhower issued a proclamation commanding that persons in Arkansas 
cease and desist from willfully obstructing the enforcement of orders of the district court. 
Proclamation No. 3204, 3 C.F.R. § 132 (1954–1958). When the proclamation was not obeyed, the 
President authorized and directed the Secretary of Defense “to take all appropriate steps to enforce 
any orders of the United States District Court of the Eastern District of Arkansas” for the removal 
of obstruction of justice. Exec. Order No. 10,730, 3 C.F.R. § 389 (1954–1958). 
34 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ. 
(Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
35 487 F.2d 700, 754 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam). 
36 Id. at 704. 
37 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 686-88, 706 (1974). 
38 Id. at 707 (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring)). 
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block. While the checks and balances fundamental to the Constitution have 
remained steadfast over time, the development of federal precedent and acts 
of Congress has resulted in the creation of a strong executive branch over 
which the President presides. But the President is not Wagner’s Wotan 
leading his fellow gods, and the White House is not Valhalla. 
C. The Antideficiency Act is Unconstitutional as  
Applied to the Judiciary 
The authority requiring federal agencies to “shut down” during a lapse in 
appropriations derives from the Antideficiency Act,39 and administrative 
guidance interpreting its text. Although the language of the Act arguably 
applies to the federal government as a whole, the modern understanding of 
how it should be applied during an appropriations impasse is limited almost 
entirely to agencies within the executive branch. The Administrative Office 
of the United States Courts (AO) has, in the past, chosen to follow that 
agency guidance. However, if the judiciary is meant to be a separate and 
independent branch of government, the Antideficiency Act cannot be applied 
to constrain the courts in the same way it constrains executive agencies. This 
is the third building block in our theory of necessity. 
The Act specifies, among other things, that “an officer or employee of the 
United States Government or of the District of Columbia government may not 
.	.	. make or authorize an expenditure or obligation exceeding an amount available 
in an appropriation or fund for the expenditure or obligation.”40 The 
government “may not accept voluntary services .	.	. or employ personal services 
exceeding that authorized by law except for emergencies involving the safety of 
human life or the protection of property.”41 In 1980 and 1981, Attorney General 
Benjamin Civiletti issued two opinions addressing the implications of the Act 
during a lapse in appropriations.42 These opinions, particularly the 1981 
Opinion, form the basis for executive branch decisions on how the federal 
government may operate—or not operate—when a budget has not been enacted.43 
 
39 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341–1342 (2012). 
40 Id. § 1341(a)(1)(A). 
41 Id. § 1342. 
42 Authority for the Continuance of Government Functions During a Temporary Lapse in 
Appropriations, 5 Op. O.L.C. 1, 11-12 (1981) [hereinafter 1981 Opinion]; Applicability of the Antideficiency 
Act Upon a Lapse in an Agency’s Appropriations, 4A Op. O.L.C. 16, 16 (1980) [hereinafter 1980 Opinion]. 
43 The 1980 Opinion explains that the previous practice of working as if on credit during a 
lapse in appropriations was unlawful under the Antideficiency Act, and the 1981 Opinion lessened 
the blow by instructing that certain “essential” government services may continue to operate during 
a shutdown. 1981 Opinion, supra note 42, at 11-12; 1980 Opinion, supra note 42, at 16.  Civiletti’s 
statement that “[t]he Constitution and the Antideficiency Act itself leave the Executive leeway to 
perform essential functions and make the government ‘workable’” is the source from which the 
government draws its distinctions between “essential” and “nonessential” workers during a 
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Neither the Antideficiency Act nor the opinions of the Attorney General 
expressly address or exempt the judiciary, and all of the official guidance on how 
the Act should be applied is directed exclusively at the executive branch.44 
Although the judiciary was able to operate for the duration of the 2013 and 2018–
19 shutdowns using nonappropriated funds, the AO recently issued guidelines 
for all federal judges that would curtail operations under the terms of the 
Antideficiency Act if a shutdown were to continue beyond the availability of 
such funds. In that situation, each court would be responsible for determining 
how to proceed and how to decide which staff are essential or nonessential.45  
The resulting funding shortfall would be of concern not just to the 
judiciary but assuredly to citizens and litigants as well. In June 1986, a 
budgetary crisis, albeit not a “shutdown” as we use the term, prompted the 
AO and the Executive Committee of the Judicial Conference to issue a 
memorandum to all district court judges requiring that they suspend civil jury 
trials under the Antideficiency Act until necessary funds could be 
reinstated.46 Following suits for emergency writs of mandamus by plaintiffs 
in pending civil cases, the Ninth Circuit held in Armster v. District Court that 
the wholesale suspension of the civil jury trial system was unconstitutional 
but ultimately denied the petitions for mandamus relief.47 In light of its 
reasoning on the unconstitutional nature of the suspension, the Ninth Circuit 
expressed its “confiden[ce]” that the district court judges would “follow their 
normal procedures and exercise their customary and reasonable judicial 
discretion in scheduling and holding civil jury trials, and that they will do so 
 
shutdown. See 1981 Opinion, supra note 42, at 11-12. Despite the fact that the 1980 and 1981 Opinions 
do not officially apply to the judiciary, the federal courts have since operated during shutdowns in 
the spirit of Civiletti’s guidance. 
44 The Congressional Research Service has noted: 
The DOJ opinions were written to guide actions in the executive branch. The 
legislative and judicial branches are not guided officially by executive branch 
documents regarding the Antideficiency Act. However, the two branches continue to 
be guided by the Constitution and the act itself and may look to executive branch 
guidelines as a point of reference.  
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34680, SHUTDOWN OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, 
PROCESSES, AND EFFECTS 4 n.21 (2018). 
45 Memorandum from James Duff, Dir., Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts to All U.S. Judges 
et al. (January 11, 2019). In its periodic memoranda on the availability of nonappropriated funds 
through the 2018–19 shutdown, the AO also provided guidance about how courts should continue to 
operate after funds became wholly unavailable. The AO explained that some staff would be required 
to report for work without pay, juries would be empaneled without pay, and court-appointed 
attorneys would be required to represent their clients without pay. Id.; see also 13 Guide to Judiciary 
Policy, ch. 2, §§ 220.25–220.30.55 (2014). 
During the 2018–19 shutdown, when the courts were able to operate on nonappropriated 
funds, the lapse in appropriations had significant effects on the judiciary’s ability to function. 
46 See Armster v. Dist. Court, 792 F.2d 1423, 1425-26 (9th Cir. 1986). 
47 Id. at 1430-31. 
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without regard to the availability or unavailability of appropriated funds for 
the payment of juror fees.”48 
Such a proposition is easier said than done. During the 1995 shutdown, 
for example, the AO responded by cancelling trainings, reducing travel of 
court personnel, and furloughing two-thirds of its staff.49 Some courts 
granted motions to continue civil cases, while at least one district court 
stopped hearing any new civil jury trials, and an appellate court rescheduled 
several arguments because government lawyers could not attend.50 When the 
government shut down again later that year, the judiciary relied on 
nonappropriated funds, but the concern about the shutdown’s effect on the 
courts continued.51 On January 4, 1996, the Executive Committee of the 
Judicial Conference issued a press release about the funding lapse’s threat to 
the judiciary, warning that “[o]ur justice system will be seriously disrupted.”52 
In the absence of official guidance on the Antideficiency Act’s application 
to the judiciary, however, there is no reason why (and no practical instruction 
on how) the courts should abide such a serious disruption. While the Armster 
court abstractly discussed the obligation of courts to continue with their 
constitutional duties even when there was no funding to do so, the effects of 
the 1995 shutdown make clear that the judicial branch simply cannot function 
in the absence of necessary funding. Because the judiciary is a separate, 
independent, and co-equal branch of government, the text of the 
Antideficiency Act cannot be read to constrain it from obtaining the funds 
necessary to perform its constitutional function or to excuse the President 
from fulfilling his or her obligations prescribed by the Take Care Clause. 
D. Proposed Solutions—Legislation or Mandamus? 
Congress and the President have a constitutional obligation to ensure 
that the independent judiciary is funded in spite of their political battles. 
The judiciary must be prepared to protect itself in the likely event of a 
future shutdown, and we propose two solutions: a congressional solution 
and a judicial solution.53 These solutions form the fourth building block 
 
48 Id. at 1431. 
49 An Inside Look at the Shutdown, THE THIRD BRANCH: NEWSLETTER OF THE FEDERAL 
COURTS (Admin. Office of the U.S. Cts., Wash., D.C.), Dec. 1995, at 1-2. 
50 Id. at 2.  
51 Patrick E. Longan, Congress, the Courts, and the Long Range Plan, 46 AM. U.L. REV. 625, 634 (1997). 
52 Id. (quoting Press Release, Exec. Comm. of the Judicial Conference (Jan. 4, 1996)). 
53 Though we draw from state precedent in advocating for a legislative solution, we recognize that 
state and federal laws differ in significant ways. Although Congress arguably has the power to abolish 
lower federal courts, the Pennsylvania Constitution mandates the existence of the judiciary. Compare 
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 337 (1816) (“[T]he language of the constitution is 
not mandatory, and . . . congress may constitutionally omit to vest the judicial power in the courts of 
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in our theory of necessity—that is, how and why the courts must utilize 
their inherent power to compel the Legislature to provide funds and/or 
compel the President to “take Care” to execute the Constitution. 
The preferred solution for funding of the judiciary is through 
congressional action. Among Congress’s enumerated powers is the power “to 
constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court.”54 Under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, we contend that Congress may and should designate 
funds for the judiciary as separate from any broad appropriations bill.55 This 
was the solution advocated by Chief Justice Rehnquist in 1995, and it makes 
even more sense now in light of the fact that the judiciary appropriation, 
which represents only two-tenths of one percent of the overall federal 
budget,56 has never been controversial. Just as Congress and the President 
have explicitly agreed that certain spending bills, such as for the military, 
should go into effect without being held captive by other controversial 
issues,57 the judiciary deserves and requires the same. 
Alternatively, the judiciary may have to move forward with a judicial 
solution, by instituting litigation based on the theory of necessity 
expressed in this Essay. Mandamus, as was successfully employed in 
Carroll v. Tate, is an appropriate remedy under 28 U.S.C. §	136158 as well 
as under the All Writs Act,59 which is “to be used only in the exceptional 
case where there is clear abuse of discretion or ‘usurpation of judicial 
power.’”60 Though a writ of mandamus has never been issued against the 
 
the United States.”), and Howard, 440 F. Supp. at 1110 (citing H. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit 
the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953)) (noting that 
Congress arguably may eliminate lower federal courts), with Pa. State Ass’n of Cty. Comm’rs, 681 A.2d at 
703 (stating that the Pennsylvania Constitution provides for the existence of the courts). 
54 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. 
55 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
56 Hearing on the Supreme Court Budget before the Subcomm. on Fin. Servs. and Gen. Gov’t of the  
H. Comm. on Appropriations, 116th Cong. 1 (2019) (statement of Justice Samuel A. Alito). Justice 
Alito made a presentation to the Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government on  
March 7, 2019 requesting $90 million for federal courts for the fiscal year 2020. Id. at 3. 
57 See Li Zhou, What’s Open—and Closed—During a Partial Government Shutdown, VOX (Jan. 19, 
2019, 3:21 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/12/20/18136667/partial-government-
shutdown-post-office-military-passports [https://perma.cc/23LE-5HYN] (explaining that active 
duty members of the military are exempt from furloughs and that most military programs had 
already been funded by bills passed prior to the 2019 shutdown). 
58 Section 1361 reads: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in 
the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency 
thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (2012). Thus, “if [the President] 
neglects or refuses to perform [his duties], he may be compelled by mandamus, in the same 
manner as other persons holding offices under the authority of the United States.” Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 141 (1803). 
59 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2012). 
60 La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., Inc., 352 U.S. 249, 257 (1957) (quoting Bankers Life & 
Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953)). 
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President, the D.C. Circuit held in National Treasury Employees Union v. 
Nixon that the district court could issue a writ of mandamus under §	1361 
to compel President Nixon to take care that federal legislation mandating 
pay adjustments be faithfully executed.61 The D.C. Circuit explained that 
“nothing in the Constitution commits to the President the ultimate 
authority to construe federal statutes, at least when those statutes concern 
federal pay,” and that the Take Care Clause “does not permit the President 
to refrain from executing laws duly enacted by the Congress as those laws 
are construed by the judiciary.”62 As we noted above, the courts are rightly 
vested with significant power to attain self-preservation—it would be 
inconsistent not to apply such a view in this context. And while mandamus 
relief may be extraordinary, it is utterly unthinkable—as the D.C. Circuit 
agreed in Nixon—that the functionality of the judicial branch should be 
subject to the whim of another branch to fulfill its constitutionally 
prescribed duties. Based on this precedent, a federal court may mandamus 
the President if he or she fails to perform his or her duty under the Take 
Care Clause to grant the judiciary reasonable and necessary 
appropriations during a shutdown. 
CONCLUSION 
Using a theory of necessity, and in order to protect its independence, 
the federal judiciary must ensure a funding source that is protected from 
infighting of the political branches. If not, the next shutdown may result 
in a constitutional crisis that is injurious to the nation, the courts, and the 
citizenry. With the building blocks identified here, we have demonstrated 
how the judiciary can rely on this theory of necessity to avoid such a crisis. 
 
We must not make a scarecrow of the law; 
 Setting it up to fear the birds of prey,  
 And let it keep one shape till custom make it  
 
61 See 492 F.2d 587, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
62 Id. at 604 (emphasis added). The D.C. Circuit’s holding is limited to a court’s ability to 
mandamus the President to perform “ministerial” duties. Id. at 616. Federal courts have not yet 
addressed whether the President’s duty to “faithfully execute the Laws” to maintain the functioning 
of the judiciary is “ministerial.” Academic articles, however, have debated this issue, recognizing the 
ambiguity in the Take Care Clause as it constrains the President’s autonomy. Compare Sam Kamin, 
Prosecutorial Discretion in the Context of Immigration and Marijuana Law Reform, 14 OH. ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 183, 196 (2016) (“[The Take Care Clause] cannot be taken to mean that the federal executive’s 
duty to administer the law is merely ministerial[.]”), with Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 3,  
at 799-800 (“The Take Care Clause is . . . naturally read as an instruction or command to the 
President to put the laws into effect . . . .”). 
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 Their perch and not their terror. 
 —WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE act 2, sc. 1. 
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